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CHARLES MASON AND 
THE BURLINGTON-NORTHWESTERN 
NARROW GAUGE RAILROAD
By W illard I. Toussaint 
Associate Professor of H istory 
Adrian College, Adrian, M ichigan
In the twenty years immediately following the Civil War 
there were two different trends in the building of railroad 
track in the United States. This was the period in which 
most American railroads adopted what is called the standard 
gauge track, the distance between the inside running edges 
of the rails being 4 feet, 8½ inches.1 The use of this width 
was largely accidental. The first English locomotives were 
built to draw coal wagons, whose axles had become so stan­
dardized that when the wagons were set on rails, the distance 
between the wheels was always 4 feet, 8½ inches. Conse­
quently, most English commercial railroads laid their tracks 
to accommodate this gauge, and by 1880 it was more com­
monly used than any other width. Since many early American 
builders purchased English engines, they naturally built their 
roads to fit them.2
STANDARD GAUGE TRACK
At the same time, however, some American promoters built 
more than 5,000 miles of narrow gauge track with only 3 feet, 
6 inches or less between the rails.3 In Iowa nearly twenty 
such lines were planned and fourteen actually built, using 
575 miles of narrow gauge track. Interest in the narrow gauge 
lines was initially sparked by the fact that they required less 
grading and less expensive equipment than the broad gauge
1 Robert S. Henry, This Fascinating Railroad Business ( New York, 
1946), p. 37.
2 Robert S. Rüssel, A History of the American Economic System ( New 
York, 1964), p. 157.
3 Henry, op. cit., p. 37.
lines. Too, many isolated communities, which the main rail­
road systems had bypassed, promoted the cause of the narrow 
gauge in the hope for train service.4
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C h a r l e s  M a so n
According to an Iowa newspaper of the period, Charles 
Mason of Burlington was one of the first to be interested in 
constructing such narrow gauge railroads in the southern part 
of the state.5 A native of New York and a West Point gradu­
ate, Mason had studied law and practiced it briefly in the 
East after his resignation from the army. He came to Iowa 
Territory in 1837, settling in Burlington. Although he was 
a lawyer and became both a federal judge and Commissioner
4 Ben Hur Wilson, “Iowa and the Narrow Gauge,” Palimpsest, XIII 
(April, 1932), 141-143.
5 Burlington Hawkeye, September 24, 1875.
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of Patents in Washington, he was also a land speculator. After 
the Civil War he engaged in numerous business ventures in 
Burlington, including banking and the promotion of compa­
nies to provide the city with its first public transportation 
and a municipal water supply.6 The story of Mason s involve­
ment with the construction of a narrow gauge railroad not 
only illustrates how one business promoter of that day suc­
cessfully meshed his interests in banking and land speculation 
with the new venture, but it also reveals some of the problems 
which management faced in financing and building narrow 
gauge lines.
For several years after the Civil War, the citizens of Bur­
lington had contemplated construction of a railroad through 
the area immediately northwest of their city. Finally in 1872 
a railroad company organized to construct a narrow gauge 
line through that region. John Gear, Charles Mason’s brother- 
in-law and later Governor of Iowa, was president of the com­
pany, the Burlington and Northwestern.7 Mason took $2,000 
in stock in an organization called the Narrow Gauge Land 
Company, designed to profit from the rise in land values 
wherever the railroad company laid its track.8
The Burlington and Northwestern hoped to finance the 
construction with aid from two sources. Soon after its organi­
zation, the management endeavored to enlist help from the 
Toledo, Peoria, and Warsaw Railroad, which ran from Peoria 
to Burlington; but the amount of proffered assistance was 
insufficient. The Burlington and Northwestern officials then 
assured the people along the proposed line that they would 
build the railroad if localities along the way raised funds 
equal to $3,500 per mile of track.
President Gear addressed a meeting at Washington, Iowa, 
concerning the railroad’s offer. He proposed to locate the 
line through the region which first obtained the right of way 
and raised enough money to grade and tie the road from
6 Emlin McClain, “Charles Mason—Iowa’s First Jurist,” Annals of 
Iowa, Third Series, IV (January, 1901), 607.
7 Burlington Hawkeye, May 23, 1875; March 22, 1872.
8 Statement of Charles Mason’s account with Thomas Hedge, March 
31, 1871, in Mason Collected Papers and Diaries, Vol. 41, MSS in Iowa 
State Department of History and Archives, Des Moines, Iowa.
Sperry, Iowa, fifteen miles from Burlington on the Burlington, 
Cedar Rapids, and Minnesota Railroad, to the east line of 
Washington County. A committee chosen to report on ways 
and means recommended that the amount asked for be raised 
by taxes in Washington County and by subscription in the 
townships between there and Burlington. Since more than 
the necessary number signed the petition for an election in 
Washington County to vote on the proposed taxes, approval 
seemed likely. However, the financial panic and other causes 
that year combined to defeat the proposed aid and the rail­
road promoters were forced to abandon the railroad project 
for the time being.9
Despite this setback, Charles Mason continued to investi­
gate the economic practicability of narrow gauge railroads 
in Iowa. Apparently he wrote to owners of such lines in 
Iowa to ascertain operating c o s t s .  One of his correspon­
dents, W. G. Crooke, wrote from McGregor that his fifteen- 
mile narrow gauge railroad cost $13,000 per mile, including 
cost of right of way, two 15-ton locomotives, two passenger 
cars, and twenty-one flat cars. This, said Crooke enthusias­
tically, was only two thirds of what it cost to operate a broad 
gauge line. He pointed out too that the rolling stock on 
the narrow gauge did not wear the track to the same extent 
as ordinary rolling stock and that “we are satisfied that weJ  O
can do as much business as is now done on any of our broad 
gauge roads at much less expense.”10
By 1875 Mason and others were convinced that a narrow 
gauge railroad northwest of Burlington would be profitable. 
Mason favored a narrow gauge line because in his opinion the 
lighter cars would have much less dead weight and therefore 
would cost less to operate than those on the broad gauge.11 
Thomas Hedge, Burlington merchant, pointed out that such 
a line would enable Burlington to recover the trade lost when 
the Rock Island Railroad extended its route into Washington, 
Keokuk, and Louisa counties.12 Construction of a narrow gauge 
seemed advantageous for yet another reason—the possibility of
9 Burlington Hawkeye, January 6, March 22, May 23, 1875.
10 W. D. Crooke to Mason, November 12, 1872, Vol. 24.
11 Mason Diary, June 17, 1876, Vol. 47.
12 Burlington Hawkeye, March 23, 1875.
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connecting with another narrow gauge railroad then being con­
structed across Illinois and Indiana. The promoter, George 
McElrov, hoped to extend his line across Ohio as far as Toledo 
and wrote the Burlington Hawkeye that he would be glad to 
connect with an Iowa narrow gauge line somewhere in west­
ern Illinois.13
Early in 1875 the towns northwest of Burlington began 
showing interest in the p r o j e c t e d  narrow gauge railroad 
through their communities. A group in Crawfordsville Town­
ship, Washington County, went on record as favoring a nar­
row gauge line from Burlington via Winfield, Crawfordsville, 
and Washington; it declared this to be the best route not only 
for trade with Burlington, but also with Chicago, St. Louis, 
and the southern markets. The next month residents of Wayne 
and other nearby townships in Henry County attended a 
similar narrow gauge meeting at Winfield. Shortly afterward, 
Burlington residents voted at a meeting to cooperate with the 
towns along the proposed route. Still another meeting fol­
lowed at Crawfordsville on February 20, 1875, attended by 
delegates from Winfield and Burlington, who pledged finan­
cial aid to the project.
Evidence of wide-spread public interest and support led to 
steps in March, 1875, toward organizing a narrow gauge rail­
road company. Delegates came to a meeting at Morning Sun 
from Flint River, Franklin, Pleasant Grove, Yellow Springs, 
and Washington townships in Des Moines County; Scott and 
Wayne townships in Henry County; Crawfordsville township 
in Washington County; and Elm Grove and Morning Sun 
townships in Louisa County. The group elected one repre­
sentative from each township to a committee charged with 
preparing Articles of Incorporation. Capital stock was set at 
$300,000, divided into s h a r e s  of $100, and the company 
opened books for subscriptions to the Burlington and North­
western Narrow Gauge Railroad. Thomas Hedge became the 
first president and R. M. Green the secretary.
The first question to be settled was where the new company 
should build its line. Several meetings in Burlington, at which 
Mason presided, attempted to solve this. One group doubted
13 George McElroy to Burlington Hawkeye, April 4, 1875.
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that they could raise enough money to build on any route. 
Another faction wished to build as far north as Sperry in Des 
Moines County, and eventually northwest to Winfield. A 
third group, which Mason supported, favored building to 
Mediapolis, three miles beyond Sperry, before building to 
Winfield. Mason’s plan finally prevailed. This decision as to 
the route brought about a change of membership on the board 
of directors. Two directors, Archibald Jackson of Elm Grove 
and Henry Wallace of Morning Sun, resigned because the 
route chosen for the railroad would not touch their towns. 
The board elected John Gear and Charles Mason to fill the 
vacancies.
To put their plans into operation, the directors negotiated 
various contracts. One was an agreement with the receiver 
of the Burlington, Cedar Rapids, and Minnesota Railroad to 
build a third rail on that line from Burlington to Mediapolis, 
a distance of fifteen miles. This third rail would accommodate 
the three-foot gauge of the proposed Burlington and North­
western. From Mediapolis, the company proposed to build 
its own nineteen-mile line to Winfield. The directors let other 
contracts for grading, tying, and bridging. At this point the 
editor of the Burlington Hawkeye seemed confident that the 
railroad’s problems were over. He wrote concerning the ne­
gotiation of contracts:
It tells us that the narrow gauge is a reality and that we 
have passed the period of promises and hopes deferred, which 
maketh the heart sick and all that sort of thing, and that we 
are entering upon the fruition of our hopes and the realization 
of promises.14
However, although the organizers of the Burlington and 
Northwestern had let contracts, they found it difficult to raise 
the necessary cash to pay for construction, rails, and rolling 
stock. The Articles of Incorporation called for $300,000 in 
stock sales to meet these expenses. By April 10, 1875, they 
had raised only $60,000, and discouraged by many refusals 
and much indifference, were inclined to give up the effort. 
Finally Burlington made a supreme effort to raise its $100,000,; 
quota. City merchants closed their doors at three o’clock
14 Burlington Hawkeye, January 20; February 7, 18, 20; March 4; 
August 7; September 24, 26; November 3, 1875; July 2, 1876.
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May 3 to devote the rest of the day to the interests of the 
narrow gauge. Then a mass meeting raised $90,000 of the 
town’s share necessary to launch the enterprise. When the 
company appealed for still more funds, Burlington raised its 
subscription to $110,000.13 Charles Mason responded to a 
special plea from President Hedge to purchase stock as a 
public-spirited citizen,15 6 and took twenty shares.17
Citizens outside Burlington proved even more reluctant to 
purchase stock in the projected line. By late summer of 1875, 
Winfield and intermediate points had contributed only $55,- 
000. In a last effort, Burlington and Winfield together raised 
the total amount to $156,000. Although these subscriptions 
would pay for construction to Winfield, they were far short 
of what the company needed for other expenses. Finally the 
company decided to omit the $300,000 clause in its Articles 
and to proceed with plans, in the hope that more money 
would be forthcoming as the road became a reality.18
Some of the company officers sought means to raise funds 
for rails and rolling stock. A 5 per cent call on the stock­
holders would bring in enough money to meet the payments 
on contracts until April, 1876, but nothing from that source 
until after April would pay for rails and locomotives. Presi­
dent Hedge told Mason that he himself was willing to furnish 
$20,000 or $25,000 for that purpose, but he had found nobody 
willing to contribute the remaining $60,000 to $80,000 which 
the company needed in addition to subscriptions. Hedge, on 
the other hand, was unwilling to make contracts for rails and 
rolling stock on his personal obligations, a necessary arrange­
ment because the rail and locomotive companies would not 
take the obligations of the Burlington and Northwestern.
In order to raise the required sum for rails, Hedge proposed 
to Mason that they each advance the company $30,000; on 
that basis, he thought he could contract for 1,300 tons of rails. 
In the belief that the price of iron would never be lower and 
would soon increase in price, Hedge thought that he and
15 Ibid., April 18; May 1, 4; December 23, 1875.
16 Thomas Hedge to Mason, April 26, 1875; Vol. 41.
17 Stock receipt, October 20, 1875, for 20 shares of stock in the Bur­
lington and Northwestern Railroad, Vol. 41.
18 Burlington Hawkeye, August 7, December 23, 1875; July 2, 1876.
Mason could compensate themselves for the risk involved by 
purchasing rails at the current price and later selling them to 
the company at a higher market price. Mason may have con­
sented to some arrangement of this sort, for the president 
later wrote him about the price of the rails: “I name the price 
to you because your interest in it is identical with mine. I 
wish you would not name it to anyone.”19
The directors then met to contrive means for buying loco­
motives and cars. They offered stockholders various induce­
ments to pay for their shares before installments were due. 
Subscribers who paid in advance could have a 10 per cent 
yearly deduction on what they owed the railroad. One sug­
gestion was that the stockholders give their notes prior to 
assessments on their subscriptions, enabling the company to 
use the notes as collateral for borrowing money before col­
lecting on subscriptions. The Burlington subscribers met these 
offers to about half the amount of their stock, nearly $55,000.20
Greatly encouraged by the stockholders’ co-operation, Mason 
and Hedge went East on buying trips early in 1876. In Janu­
ary, Mason visited Philadelphia to investigate the size and 
types of locomotives available. This was evidently an explora­
tory trip, since he made no purchases.21 Hedge, however, 
later made a buying trip to Paterson, New Jersey, and Phila­
delphia, where the companies offered him two 17-ton engines 
for $6,500 and $7,000 each. He bought one locomotive, one 
passenger coach, one combined passenger and baggage car, 
and forty freight cars.22 He estimated that this was all the 
rolling stock needed to equip the railroad for operations to 
Winfield, with the exception of one more engine and possibly 
some additional freight cars. Contracts with manufacturers 
of this rolling stock stipulated that the Burlington and North­
western pay cash for the items on delivery.
The shortage of funds, created partly because of the stock­
holders’ delinquency in meeting assessments on their sub­
scriptions, posed the next problem: How would the Burling­
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19 Thomas Hedge to Mason, January 19, March 1, 1876, Vol. 27.
20 Burlington Hawkeije, July 2, 1876.
21 Mason Diarv, January 15, 1876, Vol. 49.
22 Thomas Hedge to Mason, March 4, 1876, Vol. 27.
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ton and Northwestern be able to pay these Eastern creditors? 
The company was without funds to pay these obligations 
when they were due. On some of them, creditors positively 
refused an extension of time. On others, the Burlington and 
Northwestern secured extension of payment when certain 
directors became personally liable as endorsers. However, 
upon maturity of these extended notes, the company was in 
no better position to pay than before.23
The Burlington and Northwestern also faced the problem 
of how to pay Mason and Hedge for the rails they had pur­
chased. The president, during his Eastern trip, had purchased 
from the Cambria Iron Works in Philadelphia 1,300 tons of 
30-pound rails at $42 per gross ton. The company was to 
make delivery in four shipments during April, May, and June 
via Chicago. Freight to that point was $5 per ton and $2 
per ton more to Burlington, making a total cost of less than 
$50 per ton, $2.50 less than anyone except Hedge had be­
lieved possible. The Cambria Company was to draw on 
Hedge at Philadelphia or New York at 10 days’ sight from 
shipment of each lot.24
Naturally Hedge and Mason were anxious to have the 
Burlington and Northwestern compensate them for the obliga­
tion they had assumed in purchasing rails for the company. 
Mason favored borrowing the money needed to pay current 
debts, repaying it as the railroad collected subscriptions. He 
proposed issuing bonds amounting to not more than $5,000 
per mile to use as collateral for a loan, taking a temporary 
mortgage on the railroad as security for the bonds. Mason 
thought that this loan would not only pay the line’s financial 
obligations, but enable it to continue to Winfield. He thought 
this was a better decision than to stop work on the line until 
the company collected unpaid subscriptions.
The directors, deciding to follow Mason’s suggestion to 
borrow money, issued $100,000 in ten-year, 8 per cent bonds. 
Except for eight $100 bonds, they sold them at 50 cents on 
the dollar, hoping to raise $50,000 with which to pay off the 
company’s debts and to proceed with construction to Win­
23 Burlington Haivkeye, June 21, 1877.
24 Thomas Hedge to Mason, March 1, 1876, Vol. 27.
field.25 26 But although these bonds were backed by a mortgage 
on the railroad, they did not sell rapidly; the company raised 
only $35,000 of the expected $50,000. Mason then contributed 
$10,000, taking $20,000 in bonds, and was willing to advance 
more if necessary to put the road through to Winfield.20
Perhaps Mason’s contribution did provide the necessary 
impetus. In September, 1876, Mason wrote that the line was 
making progress, laying rails between Mediapolis and Win­
field. The next month they were as far as Yarmouth, halfway 
between the two towns. The line reached Winfield by Decem­
ber, 1876. At each of the stations—Winfield, Mt. Union, Yar­
mouth, Roscoe, and Burlington—depots and stockyards were 
built, with turntables and water towers at the termini of the 
road. The total cost of these buildings and fixtures was 
$7,007.88.27
The still unanswered question was whether the railroad 
would do enough business to pay its debts and meet expenses. 
At first the enterprise looked profitable. The line began by 
running one train a day from Winfield to Burlington, carrying 
lumber and coal to Winfield and stock and passengers on the 
return trip. Mason wrote that the company could not handle as 
promptly as necessary all the business offered it; however, 
Mason expected an eventual decline in business because of a 
scant crop in 1876. This proved to be the case. Because 
the region through which the railroad ran had almost an entire 
crop failure in 1876, followed by a similar one the next 
year, railroad business declined.
The directors realized the economic necessity of extending 
the line beyond Winfield. They derived all revenue on the 
Burlington-Winfield line, a distance of thirty-four miles, from 
less than fourteen miles of track. For fifteen miles out of Bur­
lington, the line ran over the track of the Burlington, Cedar 
Rapids, and Minnesota Railroad by means of a third rail, for 
which the Burlington and Northwestern paid a yearly rental 
of $400 per mile. For five miles beyond the third rail, the 
narrow gauge had no patronage. Thus twenty out of thirty-
25 Burlington Hawkeye, July 2, 1876; June 21, 1877.
26 Mason Diary, August 22, September 18, 1876, Vol. 49.
27 Burlington Hawkeye, January 4, June 21, 1877.
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four miles were non-paying, and the railroad men estimated 
that where the non-paying section of a road was more than 
half, the disproportion was too great for profit. The remedy, 
then, was to extend the road. Hedge, faced with this prob­
lem, declined re-election as president of the company, and 
the board of directors elected Mason in his place.
Mason hoped that townships west or northwest of Win­
field would extend financial aid to the railroad to facilitate 
its construction through their communities. He evidently ex­
pected to build through whatever townships voted the highest 
railroad taxes. He made numerous visits to Richland, Brigh­
ton, and Fremont, communities west of Winfield, to promote 
favorable tax elections there.28 * At the same time he carried 
on negotiations with leaders in Crawfordsville and Washing­
ton, Iowa,20 holding out the possibility of a railroad connection 
with Winfield if the townships would approve a subsidy.
The tax levy finally authorized in townships d i r e c t l y  
west of Winfield did not meet the estimated needs for con­
structing the narrow gauge railroad there. The engineer of 
the Burlington and Northwestern estimated the building costs 
at $5,878 per mile.30 Mason thought this would require a 5 
per cent tax levy on assessed property valuation in each town­
ship.31 F. N. Byram from Fremont wrote Mason that voters 
in his township would not approve it.32 S. H. Durfey held the 
same opinion about townships in Keokuk County. Mason 
commented in his diary, “We shall hardly build the road on a 
less tax and I shall so inform him.”33
For a time it seemed as if the tax i s s u e  in Washington 
County would be no more favorably received than in Keokuk 
County. An e l e c t i o n  in Washington Township was ad­
verse to the tax because of hard times and a belief that a 
norrow gauge r a i l r o a d  could not give any advantages in
28 Mason Diary, December 13, 1876; November 23, 1877; March 30, 
June 19, July 29, 1878, Vol. 49.
20 J. M. Crawford to Mason, July 1, 1878, Vol. 28; Burlington Hawk- 
eye, July 2, 1878.
30 J. T. Gerry to Mason, July 1, 1878, Vol. 28.
31 Mason Diary, October 31, 1878, Vol. 49.
32 F. N. Byram to Mason, August 31, 1878, Vol. 28.
33 Mason Diary, October 19, 1878, Vol. 49.
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freight rates that the community did not already possess.34 
But finally the citizens of Washington Township, on a second 
vote, approved a subsidy to the Burlington and Northwestern. 
The voters stipulated, however, that the railroad company was 
to use subsidies collected in Washington Township exclusive­
ly to pay for work on the Winfield-Washington branch.
To raise additional funds to extend the road to Washington, 
the company made two new bond issues. One was a ten-year, 
7 per cent issue of first mortgage bonds for $120,000, dated 
August 1, 1879, and secured by a mortgage on the entire line 
from Burlington to Washington — the franchise, road bed, 
buildings, and rolling stock. The other, covering the same 
property, was a second mortgage issue of $83,000 for seven 
years at 8 per cent. The second mortgage bonds were in­
tended to cover the claims of the original mortgage bond 
holders on the Burlington to Winfield line. Then in an effort 
to induce stockholders to take the first mortgage bonds so as 
the finance extension of the road to Washington, the company 
put them on the market at a 20 per cent discount.
With additional revenue in prospect, the Burlington and 
Northwestern then made plans for constructing the line to 
Washington. Engineers completed surveys and began bridg­
ing, grading, and tying in the summer of 1879. Railroad rails 
began arriving from Atlanta in September. The line reached 
Crawfordsville in November and was completed to Washing­
ton by January 19, 1880. The company then began operating 
one regular train per day35 which took four hours to complete 
the entire route.36
The road proved to be a financial success. The gross earn­
ings for the first three months of 1880 were slightly over $17,- 
000. By June, 1880, the officers told the stockholders that the 
past fiscal year had been the most financially successful one in 
the history of the road, earnings being 150 per cent more than 
those of the previous year.37 The favorable business continued 
in the succeeding months. Mason noted in his diary that re-
34 Ibid., September 23, 1878, Vol. 49.
35 Burlington Hawkeye, May 4, 1879; June 17, 1880; July 23, Septem­
ber 24, November 18, 1879; January 19, 1880.
36 Thomas Hedge to Mason, April 1, 17, 1880, Vol. 29.
37 Burlington Hawkeye, June 17, 1880.
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ceipts for the last week in November were $2,000,38 and in 
December, 1880, they totalled $7,008.48.39 During 1881 the 
railroad repaid more than five fold all the subscriptions, sub­
sidies, or other aid that its backers had requested. Operating 
expenses were 57 per cent of total receipts, leaving 43 per 
cent for net income. The Burlington Hawkeye claimed that 
the net earnings of the line were the largest of any road of its 
length in the nation.40
These profits naturally increased the value of the railroad 
securities. Hedge told Mason that if they avoided serious 
accidents, earnings would be more than sufficient to pay in­
terest on both first and second mortgage bonds.41 In March, 
1880, the company treasurer announced that he would pay 
nine months’ interest due on second mortgage bonds on May 
1. The first mortgage bonds were selling at 95, he reported, 
and he expected them to be at par very soon.42 Eventually 
Mason sold his bonds at 105, clearing something more than 
$5,000.
Although Mason declined re-election as president in June, 
1880, because of his health, he continued to serve as vice 
president and to be actively concerned about the future of 
the Burlington and Northwestern. He thought that the line 
might be extended from Winfield through Oskaloosa to Des 
Moines and from Burlington to Toledo, Ohio.43 Other Bur­
lington-Northwestern officials tried to push the matter. W. W. 
Baldwin, one of the directors, went to Oskaloosa to confer 
with leading citizens, who responded enthusiastically to the 
project. Baldwin reported that Oskaloosa would vote for a 
2 y2 per cent tax producing $46,000, having already raised 
$52,000.44 The Burlington-Northwestern board of directors had 
passed a resolution that the company would undertake the 
extension if it could secure $150,000 in aid and the right of
38 Mason Diary, November 25, 1880, Vol. 49.
39 R. M. Green, Treasurer’s Statement of Receipts and Disbursements, 
November 1880-November 1881, Vol. 35.
40 Burlington Hawkeye, February 21, 1882; June 15, 1881; February 
21, 1880.
41 Thomas Hedge to Mason, March 13, 1880, Vol. 29.
42 R. M. Green to Mason, April 12, 1880, Vol. 29.
43 Mason Diary, November 16, June 15, September 30, 1880, Vol. 49.
44 W. W. Baldwin to Mason, January 27, 1880, Vol. 29.
way and station grounds.45 They proposed to build from Win­
field or Mt. Union across the northern townships of Henry and 
Jefferson counties, then across the southwestern comer of 
Keokuk County, and to enter Mahaska County from the 
southeast.48
Although the Burlington-Northwestern never extended to 
Oskaloosa, the company fulfilled the same purpose by other 
means. They gave up the construction project to Oskaloosa in 
1880 because the taxes voted there stipulated that the narrow 
gauge extension be completed by the end of the year. This 
the company believed it would be unable to do.47 The project 
was revived in 1881, however, with the incorporation of the 
narrow gauge Burlington and Western, Charles Mason being 
one of the directors.48 The new company completed the line 
from Winfield to Oskaloosa in 1884. The two companies then 
arranged their train schedules so that the Burlington and 
Western train from Oskaloosa met the southbound Burlington- 
Northwestern train at Winfield, thus providing narrow gauge 
service between Oskaloosa and Burlington. However, al­
though the two lines sychronized their schedules so that they 
were virtually one system, each company retained its separate 
business identity.49
The narrow gauge railroads were largely superceded by 
standard gauge tracks because of economic factors. American 
freight consists of heavy, bulky products such as coal, timber, 
and petroleum. This requires large engines and cars in con­
trast to narrow gauge equipment which is light and small, 
designed to carry freight for short hauls.50 As a result, present 
narrow gauge track is confined to the mountain areas of the 
West and to limited regions in North Carolina, Tennessee, and 
Pennsylvania.51
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46 Burlington Hawkeye, April 1, 1881.
47 Thomas Hedge to Mason, February 18, 1880, Vol. 29.
48 Burlington Hawkeye, August 24, 1881.
49 Wilson, op. eit., p. 151.
50 Harold Faulkner, American Economic History (New York, 1943), 
p. 504.
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